
PLSC 695
International Security
Thursday, 09:30-11:20

Course Overview

This course covers the main theories and problems in international security, including the causes of war; crisis bargaining; diplomacy and coercion; war termination; and civil wars. Students acquire broad familiarity with the canonical literature in international security and learn how to identify opportunities for new research. The course is designed for Ph.D. students in political science.

Instructor

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Requirements and Grading

This class is intended for first or second-year graduate students in the political science PhD program. We have a lot of ground to cover in a short amount of time, so there is a lot of reading each week. The syllabus tries to cover a mix of classic readings that you should know either for the qualifying exam or because the discipline expects it of you and readings that I think are more targeted at helping you start thinking about your own research agenda. Regardless, you are expected to come to class having done all the assigned readings and ready to discuss them. Reading assignments will total about 250 pages per week.

You will write five short, two-page (single spaced) response papers over the course of the semester to facilitate seminar discussion. These are due by 8p.m. the day before class so that I can have a chance to read them before we meet. Write them whenever works for you, but not for the week in which you are running class (more on that below). The response papers should try to critically engage with the assigned readings. While you may focus in one or two readings in your response, it should be clear that you have done all the readings.

You will also be asked to run class discussion once during the semester as part of your teaching training. I will ask that you begin that class with a 15-20 minute presentation (that uses slides) summarizing the readings and posing discussion questions. I will run the first four meetings, after that you will be allowed to choose what class you want to run.

The final paper requirement is a 10-15 page research proposal or pre-analysis plan. I find that I cannot write a full paper in 6 weeks and I don't plan for you to either. However, I do expect you to make a serious pitch for a *new*, security-related research project that you haven't previously explored in other classes.

- Class Participation - includes the class you ran (20%)
- Response Papers (30% (6 % each))
- Final Paper (50%)

Course Outline and Readings

You should purchase the following book for your library. The book should be available for purchase at the Yale bookstore.

- Kenneth Neal Waltz (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley

All other readings will be made available on course reserves. You will get to collectively choose the topics for two of our meetings (out of 3 possible options). The following is the tentative list of classes, subject to your selections

- Part I: Introduction
 - Week 1: Anarchy and the “isms”
 - Week 2: The Bargaining Model and the Rational Choice Approach
 - Week 3: Working with Observational Conflict Data
 - Week 4: Behavioral IR and Experiments
- Part II: Diplomacy
 - Week 5: Signaling and Diplomacy
 - Potential Topic I: Deterrence
 - Week 6 + *x*: Alliances
 - Week 7 + *x*: War Termination
 - Potential Topic II: UN, Peacekeeping, Mediation, Agreements
- Part III: Domestic Politics
 - Week 8 + *x*: Domestic Politics

- Part IV: Civil Wars:
 - Week 9 + x : Why Do People Rebel?
 - Week 10 + x : Civilians in Civil War
 - Week 11 + x : Counterinsurgency
 - Potential Topic III: The Logic of Insurgency: Recruitment, Organization, Violence, etc.

where x represents the number of potential topics that have been selected so far.

Part I: Introduction

Week 1: Anarchy (January 16th)

We'll do a brief introduction to the course and set expectations before diving right into the "isms." Once prominent, these theories have largely fallen out of fashion at top schools. We'll try to figure out what their contribution was and why they have fallen out favor. Lakatos will provide the framework that we'll use to assess the "isms". Waltz is the seminal text in structural/defensive realism. Jervis is another seminal text often roped into the realist literature. Wendt is the seminal text in constructivism. Legro and Moravcsik provide a criticism of realism as a research program.

Required Readings:

- Please either read this 100 page long treatise on the philosophy of science by Imre Lakatos:

Lakatos, Imre (1974). "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science*, 1965 (2nd edition ed., Vol. 4, pp. 91- 196). London (UK): Cambridge University Press.

or alternatively, listen to Lakatos summarize his work in an 18-minute public radio lecture at [this link](#)

- Kenneth Neal Waltz (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley, Ch. 4-6, 7, and 9
- Alexander Wendt (1992). "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics". *International Organization* 46.2, pp. 391–425
- Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999). "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24.2, pp. 5–55
- Robert Jervis (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma". *World Politics* 30.2, pp. 167–214

Week 2: The Bargaining Model and the Rational Choice Approach (January. 23rd)

The rational choice approach and specifically, the bargaining model replaced the "isms" as the dominant research program for how IR scholars think about the causes of war. The first three set of readings constitute (in my mind), the core results and the workhorse models of this research program. Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (which is more of a CP application) and Poast both engage meaningfully with bargaining models in a conflict setting in empirical work. Fearon and Wendt is a classic piece.

I think it is important to be exposed to the work of Yale's faculty so that you can more intelligently select advisors (and so that students at other institutions don't know more than you). So throughout the syllabus I have added readings by Yale faculty. This week its Alex's turn.

Required Readings:

- James D. Fearon (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War". *International Organization* 49.3, pp. 379–414
- Robert Powell (2006). "War as a Commitment Problem". *International Organization* 60.1, pp. 169–203
- Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli (2007). "Political Bias and War". *American Economic Review* 97.4, pp. 1353–1373
- Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro (2014). "Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War". *International Organization* 68.1, pp. 1–31
- Patrick Francois, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi (2015). "How Is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica* 83.2, pp. 465–503
- Paul Poast (2015). "Lincoln's Gamble: Fear of Intervention and the Onset of the American Civil War". *Security Studies* 24.3, pp. 502–527
- James Fearon and Alexander Wendt (2002). "Rationalism v. Constructivism: a Skeptical View". *Handbook of international relations*

Week 3: Working with Observational Conflict Data (January 30th)

It's very difficult to run experiments in conflict settings. As a result, most of the data IR scholars work with is observational data. This poses several challenges, which will be the focus of this week's discussion. We'll read:

- Treier and Jackman and Carroll and Kenkel who both tackle measurement problems for some of the most first-order variables in IR.
- Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu; and Dafoe and Caughey who both find clever ways to study rare events.
- Zeitzoff is an influential piece on how to think about the data-generating process for social-media data.
- The remaining two are representative of an approach that looks at subnational observational data with lots of variation to study. Causal identification is often easier in this setting. Many junior scholars have found success writing papers in this vein including Shiro.

Required readings:

- Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman (2008). "Democracy as a Latent Variable". *American Journal of Political Science* 52.1, pp. 201–217
- Robert J. Carroll and Brenton Kenkel (2019). "Prediction, Proxies, and Power". *American Journal of Political Science* 63.3, pp. 577–593
- Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu (2011). "Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information *". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126.3, pp. 1375–1409
- Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey (2016). "Honor and War: Southern US Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation". *World Politics* 68.2, pp. 341–381
- Philipp Ager et al. (2022). "Killer Incentives: Rivalry, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939–45". *The Review of Economic Studies* 89.5, pp. 2257–2292
- Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki (2019). "Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy: An Empirical Study of the American Civil War". *American Political Science Review* 113.3, pp. 658–673
- Thomas Zeitzoff (2017). "How Social Media Is Changing Conflict". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61.9, pp. 1970–1991

Week 4: Behavioral IR and Experiments (February 6th)

The behavioral research program tries to assess whether and how deviations from rationality matter for IR, bringing psychology into the mix. This approach often relies on lab or survey experiments which have also been folded into the mix here, perhaps unfairly as there are many prominent experiments that don't test behavioral theories.

The first four readings are all squarely within the behavioral tradition. Brutger et al. assess whether our experimental work is on solid foundations. Schnakenberg and Wayne present a recent behavioral game-theoretic model, that tries to take deviations from rationality seriously. The final piece is a formal theorist's critique of the behavioral research program (I also include a suggested critique from economics).

Required readings:

- Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al. (2017). "The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations". *International Organization* 71.S1, S1–S31
- Joshua D. Kertzer (2016). *Resolve in International Politics*. Princeton University Press, Project MUSE, Ch. 1-3 (pp. 1-83)
- Jonathan Renshon (2016). "Status Deficits and War". *International Organization* 70.3, pp. 513–550
- Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler (2021). "Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship". *World Politics* 73.1, pp. 167–203
- Ryan Brutger et al. (2023). "Abstraction and Detail in Experimental Design". *American Journal of Political Science* 67.4, pp. 979–995
- Keith E. Schnakenberg and Carly N. Wayne (2024). "Anger and Political Conflict Dynamics". *American Political Science Review* 118.3, pp. 1158–1173
- Robert Powell (2017). "Research Bets and Behavioral IR". *International Organization* 71.S1, S265–S277

Suggested reading:

- Ran Spiegler (2019). "Behavioral Economics and the Atheoretical Style". *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 11.2, pp. 173–194

Part II: Diplomacy

Week 5: Signaling and Diplomacy (February 13th)

This week's readings deal with how states communicate private information in the hope of avoiding war. The two Fearon pieces are the classic pieces which established this research program. Snyder and Borghard and Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco; Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco; Katagiri and Min; and Weeks all present different empirical approaches that contributed greatly to the development of costly signaling theory. My paper presents an alternative theoretical framework for thinking about how states learn about their rivals.

Required Readings:

- James D. Fearon (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". *American Political Science Review* 88.3, pp. 577–592
- James D. Fearon (1997). "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41.1, pp. 68–90
- Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard (2011). "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound". *American Political Science Review* 105.3, pp. 437–456
- Jessica L. Weeks (2008). "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve". *International Organization* 62.1, pp. 35–64
- Casey Crisman-Cox and Michael Gibilisco (2018). "Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace". *American Journal of Political Science* 62.3, pp. 566–580
- Azusa Katagiri and Eric Min (2019). "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach". *American Political Science Review* 113.1, pp. 156–172
- Noam Reich (n.d.). "Dynamic Screening in International Crises". *Journal of Politics* ()

We won't have time to discuss these in class. But signaling theory has progressed since Fearon (1997). You should also probably be familiar with:

- Branislav L. Slantchev (2005). "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises". *American Political Science Review* 99.4, pp. 533–547
- Shuhei Kurizaki (2007). "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy". *American Political Science Review* 101.3, pp. 543–558
- Scott Ashworth and Kristopher W. Ramsay (2024). "The accountability of politicians in international crises and the nature of audience cost". *Political Science Research and Methods* 12.1, pp. 1–26

Potential Topic I: Deterrence

This is a rather formal-heavy topic. Singorino and Tarar present an empirical analysis of the classic deterrence models and show that the topic is pretty much solved. Gurantz and Hirsch offer an alternative workhorse model of deterrence; Schram extends the model to produce a profound result. Adam shows that countries have endogenous incentives to generate uncertainty prior to conflict. Baliga, Bueno de Mesquita, and Wolitzky have written the by now classic piece on deterrence in cyber warfare. McManus offers an interesting empirical perspective on how domestic politics affect deterrence. Gerard offers a foundational model on deterrence, of sorts, in repeated interaction.

Required Readings:

- Curtis S. Signorino and Ahmer Tarar (2006). “A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence”. *American Journal of Political Science* 50.3, pp. 586–605
- Ron Gurantz and Alexander V. Hirsch (2017). “Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence”. *The Journal of Politics* 79.3, pp. 1041–1056
- Peter Schram (2022). “When Capabilities Backfire: How Improved Hassling Capabilities Produce Worse Outcomes”. *The Journal of Politics* 84.4, pp. 2246–2260
- Adam Meirowitz and Anne E. Sartori (2008). “Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War”. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3.4, pp. 327–352
- Sandeep Baliga, Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, and Alexander Wolitzky (2020). “Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution”. *American Political Science Review* 114.4, pp. 1155–1178
- Roseanne W. McManus (2018). “Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence”. *The Journal of Politics* 80.3, pp. 982–995
- Gerard Padró I Miquel and Pierre Yared (2012). “The Political Economy of Indirect Control”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127.2, pp. 947–1015

Week 6 + x: Alliances (Date TBD)

Alliances present one of the key means by which states can address security threats. Leeds et al introduce an important dataset. The next four readings jointly present empirical evidence on whether alliances deter. Adam and coauthors discuss the role of moral hazard in alliances. Wolford shows how complicated things can become with more than two actors. König study alliances using subnational data. Narizny presents a classic read connecting alliance formation to domestic politics.

Required Readings:

- Brett Leeds et al. (2002). “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944”. *International Interactions* 28.3, pp. 237–260
- Brett Ashley Leeds (2003). “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes”. *American Journal of Political Science* 47.3, pp. 427–439
- Michael R. Kenwick, John A. Vasquez, and Matthew A. Powers (2015). “Do Alliances Really Deter?” *The Journal of Politics* 77.4, pp. 943–954
- Michael R. Kenwick and John A. Vasquez (2017). “Defense Pacts and Deterrence: Caveat Emptor”. *The Journal of Politics* 79.1, pp. 329–334
- Brett Ashley Leeds and Jesse C. Johnson (2017). “Theory, Data, and Deterrence: A Response to Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers”. *The Journal of Politics* 79.1, pp. 335–340
- Brett V. Benson, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay (2014). “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58.2, pp. 307–335
- Scott Wolford (2014). “Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining”. *American Journal of Political Science* 58.1, pp. 144–156
- Michael D. König et al. (2017). “Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa”. *Econometrica* 85.4, pp. 1093–1132
- Kevin Narizny (2003). “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament”. *American Political Science Review* 97.2, pp. 203–220

Week 7 + x: How Wars End? (Date TBD)

How wars end is related to how they begin. The first three readings address discuss the role of information and commitment problems in the end of wars. The remaining three papers present some empirical work that sheds additional light on these questions.

Required Readings:

- Branislav L. Slantchev (2003). “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations”. *The American Political Science Review* 97.4, pp. 621–632
- Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav L. Slantchev (2007). “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War”. *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4, pp. 755–771
- Scott Wolford, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba (2011). “Information, Commitment, and War”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.4, pp. 556–579
- Alex Weisiger (2016). “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration”. *International Organization* 70.2, pp. 347–375
- Oriana Skylar Mastro (2019). *The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime*. Cornell University Press, Ch. 1-2, pp. 12-62
- Eric Min (2020). “Talking While Fighting: Understanding the Role of Wartime Negotiation”. *International Organization* 74.3, pp. 610–632

Potential Topic II: UN, Peacekeeping, Mediation, and Agreements

This is a bit of a hodgepodge. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom is a classic piece on the limits of international cooperation. Coe and Vaynman is a more recent piece in this vein. Kuziemko and Werker; and Carnegie and Mikulaschek both study the politics of the UNSC. Nicholas; and Nomikos study the efficacy of UN missions. Adam and coauthors ask whether it is in our interest to have the UN work as an effective mediator.

Required Readings:

- George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom (1996). “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?” *International Organization* 50.3, pp. 379–406
- Andrew J. Coe and Jane Vaynman (2020). “Why Arms Control Is So Rare”. *American Political Science Review* 114.2, pp. 342–355
- Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker (2006). “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations”. *Journal of Political Economy* 114.5, pp. 905–930
- Allison Carnegie and Christoph Mikulaschek (2020). “The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars”. *International Organization* 74.4, pp. 810–832
- Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000). “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”. *American Political Science Review* 94.4, pp. 779–801
- William G. Nomikos (2022). “Peacekeeping and the Enforcement of Intergroup Cooperation: Evidence from Mali”. *The Journal of Politics* 84.1, pp. 194–208
- Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, et al. (2019). “Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization”. *Journal of Political Economy* 127.1, pp. 378–418

We won’t have time to discuss this in class but you should also be familiar with Virginia Page Fortna on this topic:

- Virginia Page Fortna (n.d.). *Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War*. Princeton University Press

Part III: Domestic Politics

Week 8 + x: Domestic Politics

This section is very condensed because many of you were also in Soyoung's course. We'll focus on a few important, somewhat disparate classics and recent pieces.

BDM²S²; Debs and Goeman; and Hyde and Saunders discuss why different regime types might behave differently in different contexts. O'neal and Russett; and Tomz and Weeks present evidence in favor of the democratic peace. Goldfein, Joseph, and McManus; and Soyoung discuss how domestic politics affects states willingness or perception of their willingness to engage in conflict.

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999). "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace". *American Political Science Review* 93.4, pp. 791–807
- Alexandre Debs and H. E. Goemans (2010). "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War". *American Political Science Review* 104.3, pp. 430–445
- Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth N. Saunders (2020). "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space". *International Organization* 74.2, pp. 363–395
- John R. O'neal and Bruce Russett (1999). "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992". *World Politics* 52.1, pp. 1–37
- Michael R. Tomz and Jessica L. P. Weeks (2013). "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace". *American Political Science Review* 107.4, pp. 849–865
- Soyoung Lee (2024). "Resources and Territorial Claims: Domestic Opposition to Resource-Rich Territory". *International Organization* 78.3, pp. 361–396
- Michael A. Goldfein, Michael F. Joseph, and Roseanne W. Mcmanus (2023). "The Domestic Sources of International Reputation". *American Political Science Review* 117.2, pp. 609–628

Part II: Civil Wars

Week 9 + x: Why Do People Rebel?

Conventional wisdom is that civil wars happen when citizens are discontent and the economy is bad. Is this true?

- James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”. *American Political Science Review* 97.1, pp. 75–90
- Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis”. *World Politics* 62.1, pp. 87–119
- Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas (2013). “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia”. *The Review of Economic Studies* 80.4, pp. 1384–1421
- Graeme Blair et al. (2013). “Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan”. *American Journal of Political Science* 57.1, pp. 30–48
- Eli Berman, Michael Callen, et al. (2011). “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.4, pp. 496–528
- Oliver Vanden Eynde (2018). “Targets of Violence: Evidence From India’s Naxalite Conflict”. *The Economic Journal* 128.609, pp. 887–916
- Eoin F McGuirk and Nathan Nunn (2024). “Transhumant Pastoralism, Climate Change, and Conflict in Africa”. *The Review of Economic Studies*, rdae027

Week 10 + x: Civilians and Violence in Civil War

When and why are civilians targeted and how do they respond to violence? Kalyvas presents the foundational reading on the topic, further developed by Balcells. Gibilisco, Kenkel, and Rueda present an empirical application of the theory. Kalah Gade and Schubiger both present more civilian-focused theories and evidence as to how civilians respond to violence in civil wars.

Required readings

- Stathis N. Kalyvas (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press, Ch. 7 and 9
- Laia Balcells (2017). *Rivalry and Revenge : the Politics of Violence During Civil War*. Cambridge University Press, Ch. 1 and 2
- Michael Gibilisco, Brenton Kenkel, and Miguel R. Rueda (2022). “Competition and Civilian Victimization”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66.4-5, pp. 809–835
- Emily Kalah Gade (2020). “Social Isolation and Repertoires of Resistance”. *American Political Science Review* 114.2, pp. 309–325
- Livia Isabella Schubiger (2021). “State Violence and Wartime Civilian Agency: Evidence from Peru”. *The Journal of Politics* 83.4, pp. 1383–1398

Week 11 + x: Counterinsurgency (April 17th)

This area of research has seen a lot of growth in the last decade. The “hearts and minds” approach adopted by the US as official doctrine in 2006 maintains that successful counterinsurgency should aim to win over the civilian population, and isolate them from the insurgency. Berman, Shapiro and Felter present the academic version of how and why the doctrine should work. Shaver and Shapiro; Condra and Shapiro; Lyall; and Dell and Querebin all test the theory in different ways. Sexton and Crost et al study the insurgent response to hearts and minds. Hazelton presents a critique of the doctrine.

- Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter (2011). “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq”. *Journal of Political Economy* 119.4, pp. 766–819
- Andrew Shaver and Jacob N. Shapiro (2021). “The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65.7-8, pp. 1337–1377
- Jason Lyall (2009). “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.3, pp. 331–362
- Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro (2012). “Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage”. *American Journal of Political Science* 56.1, pp. 167–187
- Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston (2014). “Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict”. *American Economic Review* 104.6, pp. 1833–1856
- Renard Sexton (2016). “Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan”. *American Political Science Review* 110.4, pp. 731–749
- Melissa Dell and Pablo Querubin (2018). “Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies*”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133.2, pp. 701–764
- Jacqueline L. Hazelton (2021). *Bullets Not Ballots Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare*. Project MUSE, Ch. 1-2 (pp. 1-28)

We won’t cover these in class, but you should also be familiar with arguments related to regime type and counterinsurgency success, such as those found in these readings.

- Gil Merom (2003). *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam*. Cambridge University Press

- Jason Lyall (2010). “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration”. *International Organization* 64.1, pp. 167–192
- Paul K. MacDonald (2013). ““Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion”: The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure”. *International Organization* 67.2, pp. 253–286

Potential Topic III: The Logic of Insurgency: Recruitment, Organization, Violence etc.
(April 24th)

This is a bit of an eclectic topic with a lot of reading. Weinstein is the classic introduction to this topic. Shapiro introduces the principal-agent problem to insurgencies. Berman and Ying discuss the role of religion in insurgent/terrorist groups. Dell's paper discusses the motivations for violence behind criminal organizations.

- Jeremy M. Weinstein (2007). *Inside Rebellion : the Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge University Press, Ch. 1-4
- Jacob N. Shapiro (2013). *The Terrorist's Dilemma :Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Ch. 2 and 5
- Eli Berman and David D. Laitin (2008). "Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model". *Journal of Public Economics* 92.10, pp. 1942–1967
- Luwei Ying (n.d.). "Military Power and Ideological Appeals of Religious Extremists". *Journal of Politics* ()
- Melissa Dell (2015). "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War". *American Economic Review* 105.6, pp. 1738–1779